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ANTITRUST

Can indirectpurchasersrecover damages
understate antitrustlaws?
by Ramon A.Klitzke

State of California, et al.
V.

ARC America Corporation, et aL
(Docket No. 87-1862)
ArgumentDate: Feb.27,1989
This may prove to be the most significant case of the
decade for consumers injured by anticompetitive conduct.
State and federal antitrust laws provide the remedy of
money damages to purchasers of goods injured by a seller's
anticompetitive conduct. Federal law provides a private
treble damages remedy under Section 4 of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. § 15. Many states have similar statutes which
antitrust plaintiffs are finding Increasingly attractive.
Aproduct typically passes through a chain of distribution
before reaching the ultimate consumer. A direct purchasing
middleman will resell a product to another purchaser who
thereby becomes an indirect purchaser "downstream" from
the original seller. A direct purchaser paying more than the
competitive price to a member of an Illegal price-fixing cartel
has clearly suffered a compensable antitrust injury.
An indirect purchaser, separated from the antitrust violator by at least one reseller, has also been injured. But indirect
damages are uncertain unless the resale was under a "preexisting, fixed quantity, cost-plus contract," thus passing the
injury on intact to the Indirect purchaser. Although the
indirect purchaser is clearly damaged to some degree even
when all direct damages are not passed on to the indirect
purchaser as such, the Supreme Court has denied damages
to indirect purchasers. Illinois Brick v. Illinois 431 U.S. 720,
736 (1977).
Unlike Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 13 states and the
District of Columbia provide statutory remedies for indirect
Injury caused by anticompetitive conduct. In Californiav.
ARCAmerica Corp.the Court has an opportunity to decide
whether these statutes, which permit indirect purchasers to
sue for damages, are preempted under the supremacy clause
of the U.S. Constitution.
ISSUES
1. Does the supremacy clause preclude a state from authoRamon A lltke is a professor of law at the Marquette
University Law School, 1103 West Wisconsin Ave., Milwaukee, WI53233; telephone (414) 224-5366
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rizing a state antitrust remedy for indirect purchasers?
2. Does the federal statutory remedy for direct purchasers
bar a state from authorizing a remedy for indirect
purchasers?
FACIS
In the 1970's, the Antitrust Division of the Arizona Attorney General's Office uncovered evidence of a national conspiracy among cement manufacturers to fix and stabilize
prices in the face of declining demand and excess capacity.
Agreements governed virtually every aspect of the manufac.
ture and sale of cement and cement products, ranging from
the rate of return to be received by the industry and the
formula for calculating transaction prices, to the standardization of credit terms, product specifications and even such
trivial details as night-time unloading allowances.
Beginning in September of 1976, the states of Arizona,
California, Minnesota and Alabama filed complaints against a
number of cement manufacturers and their trade association,
alleging a conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1, and seeking damages, injunctive relief, attorney
fees and costs. The plaintiffs also alleged violations of each of
their state laws and included claims for damages based on
indirect purchases of cement.
Private plaintiffs filed "tag-along" complaints based on
Arizona's investigation and filing. A total of 35 lawsuits were
filed in 12 federal district courts. By 1980, all of the complaints had been transferred to the Arizona federal district
court. The state law claims were transferred and consolidated
with the federal claims under the court's pendent
jurisdiction.
By October 1981, settlements had been agreed upon
totaling $32 million in cash plus 135,000 shares of stock in
one of the defendant companies. The district court approved
a plan for distributing the settlement fund In proportion to
the amount of cement purchases. The distribution of the
settlement fund is the subject of this appeal to the Supreme
Court.
The district court refused to allow payments out of the
settlement fund for claims based on state indirect-purchaser
statutes. The judge held that state downstream-purchaser
statutes "are clear attempts to frustrate the purposes and
objectives of Congress, as Interpreted by the Supreme Court
in Illinois Brick and, accordingly, are preempted by federal
law."
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit
affirmed, holding that state Indirect-purchaser statutes imperPREVIEW

missibly interfere with policies behind the federal antitrust
laws and are therefore preempted. The Court concluded that
"state law claims in this case based on indirect purchases of
cement that do not fill within any exception to the rule of
llinois Brick are preempted because they stand 'a.s an
obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and
objectives' of federal antitrust law." In Re Cement and
Concrete Antitrust Litigation,817 F.2d 1435, 1447 (9th Cir.
1987).
The states of Alabama, Arizona, California and Minnesota
have appealed to the Supreme Court. They seek to reach into
the settlement fund to recover damages as indirect purchasers of cement and cement-containing products. The ARC

American Corporation was a direct purchaser of cement from
the defendants who settled and was a member of one of the
designated classes entitled to a share of the settlement fund.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFCANCE
The history of antitrust jurisprudence is rich with state
antitrust regulation. States have enjoyed crucial roles
throughout the arena of antitrust development. Early in the
19th century, a number of states undertook common-law and
statutory prosecutions for conspiracies in restraint of trade.
State antitrust activity greatly increased at the turn of the
century as new collective business arrangements proliferated
by the thousands, and economic concentration increased
substantially. Prior to the enactment of the Sherman Act in
1890, 15 U.S.C. § 1-7, at least 14 state constitutions had
antimonopoly provisions. By 1915, at least 35 states had their
own antitrust legislation.
When enacting the Sherman Act, Congress expressed a
clear intent that the federal law supplement, and not inhibit,
state activity aimed at suppression of restraints of trade and
monopolies:
Whatever legislation Congress may enact on this subject, within
the limits of its authority, will prove of little value unless the
States shall supplement it by such auxiliary and proper legislation as may be within their legislative authority.
H. R. Rep. No. 1707,51st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1890).
The intent of Congress to leave state antitrust enforcement intact resulted, of course, in antitrust enforcement at
both federal and state levels.
After the turn of the century, federal prosecution of
antitrust cases increased dramatically despite persistent opposition. However, for three decades after the adoption of
the Sherman Act, state antitrust efforts complemented federal
law in responding to problems of industrial combination,
collusion and predation. See May, Antitrust Practice and
Procedurein the Formative Era, 135 Penn.L.Rev. 495, 592
(1987). Eventually state enforcement actions were vastly
outnumbered by federal cases, but the body of state antitrust
law continued to influence antitrust jurisprudence. Federal
judges struggling to develop federal antitrust law often relied
on pertinent state opinions.
Expansion of state antitrust law encountered determined
opposition, however. State regulation was repeatedly atIssueNo. 10

tacked s violative of the commerce clause of the U.S.
Constitution. Debate on the constitutionality of state antitrust
power centered on the effect of state law beyond a state's
borders. Federal and state courts held that states could no
longer constitutionally regulate activities that were in interstate commerce or had an effect on interstate commerce.
For a half-century after enactment of the Sherman Act, the
magnitude and relative significance of state antitrust activity
gradually declined. State laws were limited to local anticompetitive restraints; restraints that affected interstate commerce
were prosecuted under federal law.
This has all changed in the past 20 years. The Supreme
Court now upholds state antitrust laws. The cases now hold
that such laws do not interfere with the interstate flow of
goods and do not discriminate against interstate commerce.
Since the early 1970's, the Supreme Court has gradually
restricted the scope of federal antitrust liability. The federal
courts, largely influenced by the work of the "Chicago
School" of economics, have decided cases that reduce the
importance of federal antitrust law. State courts and state
attorneys general, on the other hand, have not widely embraced the "Chicago School" theory. To fill the void left by
the federal courts, states have broadened the scope of their
antitrust laws and many plaintiffs now choose state courts as
their forums. State antitrust law may be enforced against
antitrust violations that occur anywhere in the nation, provided that there are sufficient harmful effects within the state
itself. However, where the federal and state statutes are
inconsistent or provide different remedies, further aggressive
enforcement under state antitrust law could create chaos in
the federal-state antitrust scheme.
Under the supremacy clause, federal law preempts state
law when (1) Congress evidences an intent to occupy a
given field, or (2) the state law actually conflicts with federal
law, that is, when it is impossible to comply with both state
and federal law "or where the state law stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress." Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248
(1984).
There is no tradition of preemption by federal antitrust
law. Even state statutes contrary to the policies of the Sherman Act have been upheld. Because of the original congressional intent to maintain a two.tiered antitrust enforcement
system, the Supreme Court has been extremely reluctant to
hold that state antitrust laws have been preempted by federal
law. To show preemption of state antitrust law, it is not
sufficient to merely assert that federal law occupies the field.
The Supreme Court has held that preemption will be found
only if there is clear evidence of actual conflict, which
requires that compliance with the state law would force the
defendant to disobey the federal law. See Exxon Corp. v.
GovernorofMd, 437 U.S. 117,130 (1978).
The instant case, California v.ARCAmerica Corporation,
forces the Supreme Court to decide the extent to which state
antitrust statutes may supplement federal statutes. The Court
must decide whether the existence of a federal remedy
285

under Section 4 of the Clayton Act precludes the states from
authorizing a remedy for indirect victims injured by anticompetitive conduct that is condemned by both federal and state
law. The Court must determine whether state remedial
provisions reduce or impair the effectiveness of the treble
damages provision of the Clayton Act.
Critical to the decision in this case will be the Court's
reading of Hanover Shoe Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery
Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968), and Illinois Brick v. liinoi4 431
U.S. 720 (1977).
In Hanover Shoe the Supreme Court held that a defendant in an antitrust suit cannot assert as a defense that the
plaintiff did not suffer damages because the plaintiff passed
the defendant's illegal overcharges on to the plaintiffs customers (the indirect purchasers). The Court rejected this
defense because proving the amount of a passed-on overcharge "would often require additional long and complicated theories." 392 U.S. at 493. Hanover Shoe was greeted
generally with approval. It reduced plaintiffs' costs of litigating a price-fixing case by eliminating the need to fight a
defendant's passing-on claim.
The Illinois Brick decision brought forth a flood of
protests and became, perhaps, the single most significant
legal reason for the declining number of antitrust lawsuits in
federal courts. In Illinois Brick, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the holding of HanoverShoe and then went on to
hold that indirect purchasers are not entitled to recover
treble damages against antitrust violators under Section 4 of
the Clayton Act, except in special circumstances.
The defendant manufacturers and distributors in Illinois
Brick conspired to fix the price of concrete block in the
Greater Chicago area at an artificially high level in violation
of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. The masonry contractors
who purchased the block passed on the resulting overcharge
to the general contractors in the form of higher prices for
masonry structures. The plaintiffs were injured when these
general contractors, in turn, incorporated this overcharge
into the prices charged to the plaintiffs for the completed
buildings. However, the Court held that indirect damages
were not available to them. Many cases have elaborated on
the decision and have created some exceptions to the rule.
Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, Sec. 337.2 (Supp.
1988).
Newspaper editorials called Illinois Brick unjust to consumers. More than a dozen state statutes were amended to
provide that injured indirect purchasers could recover under
state law. Bills designed to overturn the Illinois Brick rule
were introduced in at least four sessions of Congress. A
number of articles in academic and professional journals
have argued that indirect purchasers should have standing to
sue for damages. A thorough article on the benefits and costs
of changing the Illinois Brick rule has been published by
George J. Benston: Indirect Purchasers'Standing to Claim
Damages in Price Fixing Antitrust Actions: A Benefit/Cost
Analysis of Proposals to Change the Illinois Brick Rule, 55
Antitrust .J. 213 (1986).
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Although Illinois Brick stands for the general proposition
that indirect purchasers are barred from recovery under
Section 4 of the Clayton Act, the question remains whether
the rationale of Illinois Brick will preclude states from
providing remedies for those indirectly injured by anticompetitive conduct under state law. See Note, IndirectPurchaser Suits Under State Antitrust Laws A Detour Around the
llinoisBrick Wall, 34 Stanford L.Rev. 203 (1981).
Together Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick define three
objectives of federal antitrust law in the context of the
present case: (1) avoiding unnecessarily complex litigation;
(2) providing incentives to direct purchasers to bring private
damages actions; and (3) avoiding multiple liability for
defendants. The Supreme Court will now have an opportunity to decide whether these objectives outweigh the rights of
states to provide state remedies for indirect purchasers.
In Californiav. ARC America Corp., the Supreme Court
could decide to limit the power of the states to provide
independent antitrust remedies that supplement federal
remedies. On the other hand, some commentators find no
inexorable trend toward greater federal intrusion into state
antitrust regulation. Many recent cases reflect an increasing
deference toward state regulation. See Garland, Antitrust
and State Action, 96 Yale LJ. 486 (1987). A number of
commentators argue that state statutes that provide remedies
for indirect purchasers should not be preempted by the
federal antitrust laws. See Note, State Indirect Purchaser
Statutes. The Preemptive Power of Illinois Brick, 62 Boston
U.L.Rev. 1241 (1982).
In Californiav. ARC America Corp., the Supreme Court
must carefully consider what it means to say that federal and
state antitrust laws are designed to reinforce and supplement
each other. See Hovenkamp, State Antitrust in the Federal
Scheme, 58 Ind. LJ. 375, 404 (1983). States are entitled to
their own antitrust laws, even if they differ from federal law.
The Supreme Court is unlikely to overrule the Illinois
Brick case in California v. ARC America Corp. The states
have not asked for this. Should the Court decide that indirect
purchasers may get damages under state statutes, the Court
would find this to be an exception to the Illinois Brick rule.
Such a result would benefit thousands of consumers who are
injured because of upstream antitrust violations.
ARGUMENTS
For the States of California Alaban, Arizona and Minnesota (Counsel of Record, Thomas Greene, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, State of Calfornia, 1515 K St.,
Suite 511, Sacramento, CA 95814 telephone (916) 3247874):
1. State protection of downstream victims of anticompetitive
conduct is an appropriate and lawful exercise of traditional state police power.
2. The legislative record of the federal antitrust laws unequivocally supports the validity of the remedial provisions of the states' laws.
3. The remedial provisions of the states' antitrust laws do not
PREVIEW

conflict with the federal enforcement scheme.
4. The remedial provisions of the states' laws advance Important congressional purposes.
5. The downstream-purchaser remedies of the states' laws
properly supplement federal antitrust law.
For ARC America Corporation (Counsel of Record, Theodore B. Olson and Phillip H. Rudolph, 1050 Connecticut
Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20036 telephone (202) 9558500):
1. State statutes are preempted by federal law when they
stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.
2. The Supreme Court in Illinois Brick concluded that
Congress' principal purpose in enacting Section 4 of the
Clayton Act was not to make victims whole, but to
encourage private enforcement of the federal antitrust
laws.
3. The 9th Circuit properly held that the indirect-purchaser
statutes at issue in this case stand as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.
4. Congressional silence does not support an inference that
Congress intended to allow the states to enact antitrust
laws that present an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the goals of the federal antitrust laws.
For Class Members Allied Concrete, et aL (Counsel of
Record, DavdJ Leonard,P. 0. Box 191, 155 West Council
St., Tucson, AZ 85702; telephone (602) 622-7733):
1. Indirect-purchaser sharing in the settlement fund would
require a new, incredibly complex and expensive round
of litigation.
AMICUS BRIEFS
In Support of the States of California, Alabama,Arizona
and Minnesota
Five separate amicus briefs were filed on behalf of the
states. In one brief, the U.S. Department of Justice argued
that Congress did not preempt state statutes affording damage remedies to indirect purchasers because it did not intend
to interfere with the broad authority of the states to enact and

Issue No.10

enforce antitrust laws in aid of their police powers. Such laws
do not irreconcilably conflict with federal law.
Thirty-five states and the District of Columbia filed a brief
arguing that Congress has implicitly validated state indirectpurchaser statutes by sanctioning the District of Columbia's
antitrust act. Also, traditional state police powers are not
preempted unless Congress exhibits a clear and manifest
purpose to preempt them.
Twenty of the above states filed a brief arguing that
Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick did not state the purposes
and objectives of Congress embodied in Section 4 of the
Clayton Act.
The National Conference of State Legislatures, the National League of Cities, the National Governors' Association, the
U.S. Conference of Mayors, the Council of State Governments, the International City Management Association and
the National Association of Counties filed a collective brief
arguing that the decision of the 9th Circuit in this case was
contrary to the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652. That
Act directs that the laws of the several states, except where
the U.S. Constitution or statutes otherwise require, are the
rules of decision in civil actions in U.S. courts.
The Consumers Union of the United States argued that
allowing indirect purchasers to recover damages caused by
monopoly overcharges is consistent with sound antitrust
policy.

In Support ofARCAmerica Corporation
Three amicus curiae briefs supported ARC America. The
Business Roundtable argued that experience with state indirect-purchaser statutes demonstrates that they undermine
federal antitrust policy.
The Chamber of Commerce of the United States argued
that the state indirect-purchaser statutes' inevitable impairment of the federal treble damages scheme dictates preemption of such statutes under accepted supremacy clause
principles.
Finally, the National Association of Manufacturers argued
that federal antitrust policy prohibits multiple liability in
suits by direct and indirect purchasers and therefore state
indirect-purchaser statutes are preempted.
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